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1. LIST OF ALL PARTIES
The caption on the cover shows all parties- namely,
Peter A. Davis, Petitioner,
and the
Utah Department of Workforce Services,
Division of Adjudication,
Workforce Appeals Board,
and the employer,
First Choice Emissions and Inspections, LLC, Respondents

i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2. TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ALL PARTIES

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT AS TO PRIOR ORRELATED

iv

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

6

RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

10

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT

11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

28

ADDENDA/APPENDICES

i

ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES CITED
Allen v. Dept. of Employment Security,
781 P.2d 888 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

18

Arrow Legal Solutions Group, PC v. Workforce Services,
2007 UT App. 9, 156 P.3d 830
Fragomeno v. Department of Workforce Services,
2011 UT App. 100
Kimball v. Dept. of Workforce Services,
2011 UT App. 259

1, 24

1, 19, 22

2, 8, 11, 19, 22

Martinez v. Department of Workforce Services,
2011 UT App. 273
Nelson v. Dept. of Employment Security,
801 P.2d 158 (Utah 1990)

22

3

Prosper Team, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Services,
2011 UT App. 246

3, 23

Tasters, L.T.D., Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security,
863 P.2d 12 (Utah 1993), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154

2, 12, 21

Welte v. Department of Workforce Services,
2011 UT App. 46

1, 19, 23

iii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

35A-4-405 (1)

1-3, 11, 23

35A-4-508 (8)

1

63G-4-401

1

78A-3-102 (3) (a)

1

OTHER SOURCES CITED

Rule 994-405-101

1, 4, 11, 26

Rule 994-405-103

2, 5, 22

Rule 994-405-201

1, 4, 11, 19

Rule 994-405-204

1, 4, 11

STATEMENT AS TO PRIOR OR RELATED CASES
There are no prior or related appeals.

iv
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in the matter pursuant to §
35A-4-508 (8) of the Utah Employment Security Act, § 63G-4-401 of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act and § 78A-3-102 (3) (a) of the Utah Judicial Code.
5. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE NO. 1: Are the Agency's findings of fact on the issue of
whether Mr. Davis quit or was terminated supported by substantial evidence?
(A)

CITATIONS TO DETERMINATIVE STATUTES,

RULES OR CASES:
Utah Code, § 35A-4-405 (1), Utah Administrative Code, Rule
994-405-101, "Voluntary Leaving (Quit)-General Information," Rule 994405-201, "Discharge-General Definition," Rule 994-405-204, "Quit or
Discharge."
(B)

APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE

REVIEW, WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: The standard of review
applicable to appellate review of this administrative agency's findings of fact is
"substantial evidence." Arrow Legal Solutions Group. PC v. Department of
Workforce Services. 2007 UT App. 9, 156 P.3d 830, Welte v. Department of
Workforce Services, 2011 UT App. 46, Fragomeno v. Department of
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Workforce Services. 2011 UT App. 100, Kimball v. Department of Workforce
Services, 2011 UT App. 259.
ISSUE NO. 2: Are the Agency's findings of fact on the issue of
whether it would be contrary to the equity and good conscience standard to deny
unemployment insurance benefits to Mr. Davis supported by substantial evidence?
(A)

CITATIONS TO DETERMINATIVE STATUTES,

RULES OR CASES:
Utah Code, § 35A-4-405 (1), Utah Administrative Code, Rule
994-405-103, "Equity and Good Conscience."
(B)

APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE

REVIEW, WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: The standard of review
applicable to appellate review of this administrative agency's findings of fact is
"substantial evidence." Tasters. L.T.D.. Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security.
863 P.2d 12 (Utah 1993), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154, Kimball v. Department
of Workforce Services , 2011 UT App. 259.
ISSUE NO. 3: Is the Agency's conclusion of law that Mr. Davis
should be denied unemployment insurance benefits erroneous, arbitrary, capricious or
does it constitute an abuse of discretion or is it otherwise contrary to the Agency's
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past decisions and practice or is it not within the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality?
(A)

CITATIONS TO DETERMINATIVE STATUTES,

RULES OR CASES:
Utah Code, § 35A-4-405 (1).
(B)

APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE

REVIEW, WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: The standard of review
applicable to appellate review of this administrative agency's conclusions of
law is "reasonableness." The appellate court accords intermediate deference to
the agency's determinations of law and reviews the matter under a
reasonableness standard, Prosper Team, Inc. v. Department of Workforce
Services, 2011 UT App. 246, Nelson v. Dept. of Employment Security m 801
P.2d 158 (Utah 1990).
6. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated, § 35A-4-405 (1). "Ineligibility for Benefits."
Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (5), an
individual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of
establishing a waiting period:
(1) (a) For the week in which the claimant left
work voluntarily without good cause, if so found by the
division, and for each week thereafter until the claimant
has performed services in bona fide, covered employment
3
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and earned wages for those services equal to at least six
times the claimant's weekly benefit amount.
(b) A claimant may not be denied eligibility for
benefits if the claimant leaves work under circumstances
where it would be contrary to equity and good conscience
to impose a disqualification.
(c) Using available information from employers
and the claimant, the division shall consider for the
purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the
claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions
evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor
market in reaching a determination of whether the
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good
conscience.
***

Rule 994-405-101. "Voluntary Leaving-General Information."
A separation is considered voluntary if the claimant
was the moving party in ending the employment
relationship. ...Two standards must be applied in
voluntary separation cases: good cause and equity and
good conscience. If good cause is not established, the
claimant's eligibility must be considered under the equity
and good conscience standard.
***

Rule 994-405-201. "Discharge-General Definition."
A separation is a discharge if the employer was the
moving party in determining the date the employment
ended....
&**

Rule 994-405-204. "Quit or Discharge."
4
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The circumstances of the separation as found by
the Department, determine whether it was a quit or
discharge. The conclusions on the employer's records, the
separation notice or the claimant's report are not
controlling on the Department....
***

Rule 994-405-103. "Equity and Good Conscience."
(1) If the good cause standard has not been met, the
equity and good conscience standard must be applied in
all cases except those involving a quit to accompany,
follow, or join a spouse as outlined in Section R994-405104. If there were mitigating circumstances, and a denial
of benefits would be unreasonably harsh or an affront to
fairness, benefits may be allowed under the provisions of
the equity and good conscience standard if the following
elements are satisfied:
(a) the decision is made in cooperation with
the employer;
(b) the claimant acted reasonably;
(c) the claimant demonstrated a continuing
attachment to the labor market.
(2) The elements of equity and good conscience are
defined as follows:
(a) In Cooperation with the Employer. A
decision is made in cooperation with the employer
when the Department gives the employer an
opportunity to provide separation information.
(b) The Claimant Acted Reasonably. The
claimant acted reasonably if the decision to quit
was logical, sensible, or practical. There must be
evidence of circumstances which, although not
sufficiently compelling to establish good cause,
would have motivated a reasonable person to take
similar action. Behaviors that may be acceptable to
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a particular subculture do not establish what is
reasonable.
(c) Continuing Attachment to the Labor
Market. A continuing attachment to the labor
market is established if the claimant took positive
actions which could have resulted in employment
during the first week subsequent to the separation
and each week thereafter. Evidence of an
attachment to the labor market may include:
making contacts with prospective employers,
preparing resumes, and developing job leads. An
active work search should have commenced
immediately subsequent to the separation whether
or not the claimant received specific work search
instructions form the Department. Failure to show
an immediate attachment to the labor market may
not be disqualifying if it was not practical for the
individual to seek work. Some examples of
circumstances that may interfere with an immediate
work search include illness, hospitalization,
incarceration, or other circumstances beyond the
control of the claimant provided a work search
commenced as soon as practical.
7. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a. •:?

Nature of the Case: This is an appeal from a final decision

of the Utah Department of Workforce Services' Workforce Appeals Board,
issued on July 14,2011. R. at 134-139.
b.

Course of Proceedings: Following First Choice Emissions'

termination of Mr. Davis' employment, employee Peter A. Davis applied to the
Utah Department of Workforce Services for unemployment insurance benefits.
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R. at 1-2. The Department issued a Decision of Eligibility for Unemployment
Insurance Benefits which deemed Mr. Davis eligible and which approved
benefits to Mr. Davis. R. at 14-15. The Employer appealed the Department's
decision, R. at 16-21, and an administrative hearing followed. R. at 39-112.
After the evidentiary hearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision
finding that Mr. Davis had quit rather than been discharged by the Employer
and, therefore, denied benefits. R. at 113-119. Mr. Davis timely appealed to
the Workforce Appeals Board ("Board"). R. at 121-126.
c.

Disposition at the Agency: The Board upheld the

Administrative Law Judge's decision. R. at 134-139. This appeal ensued.
Petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for Writ of Review of the Decision of
the Workforce Appeals Board.
8. RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD
Peter A. Davis did not quit his employment but when, due to an on-thejob injury, he became unable to work for several days, his Employer discharged him.
R. at 78.
Mr. Davis testified that on Monday, November 1, 2010, he hit his head
on a concrete beam at his workplace. R. at 78. He testified that he told the owner's
son, Dale, about the injury at 2:30 p.m. that same day but agreed he would stay and
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keep working until the end of the day. R. at 78-79. He testified that on November 2,
his wife called the Employer to report that he would not be in due to the pain he was
experiencing from the injury. R. at 79. Wednesday, November 39 was Mr. Davis1
scheduled day off. R. at 79. Mr. Davis testified that on November 4, he and his wife
drove to the Employer's place of business to tell the Employer he was not yet able to
return to work. R. at 79. Mr. Davis testified that he went into the shop instead of just
calling his boss because "dealing with these guys [the owner and his son] on the
phone isn't very punctual or nice. You're better off if you show up and let them see
you in the condition you're in." R. at 79, 80. Mr. Davis testified that the next day,
November 5, he and his wife again returned to the shop to explain that Mr. Davis was
still in too much pain to work. R. at 80.
Mr. Davis testified that on November 5 the owner suggested that Mr.
Davis see the chiropractor with whom the owner treated. R. at 80. The owner called
and made arrangements for the visit. R. at 80. Mr. Davis went for a treatment that
day. While Mr. Davis was still in the chiropractor's office, the chiropractor called the
owner. R. at 80. Mr. Davis testified he could not hear all of the conversation
between the chiropractor and the owner, but the chiropractor advised Mr. Davis to try
and return to work on a light duty basis on Monday, November 8. R. at 80.
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On Saturday, November 6, Mr. Davis had a second treatment with the
same chiropractor. R. at 81. After that appointment, Mr. Davis went to his
workplace and told the owner he was still not able to work. R. at 81. During the
hearing, Mr. Davis eventually recalled that he did tell the Employer he would try to
return to work on Monday, November 8; in other words, Mr. Davis recognized that
he must have told the owner he would try and be back to work on Monday,
November 8. R. at 81.
Mr. Davis testified that on Sunday, November 7, he was still in great
pain and went to an InstaCare facility and was prescribed pain killers, muscle
relaxers, and an anti-inflammatory medication. R. at 82. Mr. Davis testified that on
Monday, November 8, he and his wife went to the shop and told the owner he was
still unable to work. R. at 82. Mr. Davis' wife testified that she called the Employer
on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday (November 9 to 12) of that same week
to report that Mr. Davis was still not able to work. R. at 83-84. Mr. Davis' wife
testified that Mr. Davis did not make the telephone calls himself because he was
incapacitated due to pain and the medication he was taking. R. at 83-84, 97-98
Mr. Davis never intended to quit his job. R. at 86. Mr. Davis testified
that on Saturday, November 13, 2010, he and his wife went to the shop to talk to
Gary Gee (the owner of the business), to ask for a leave of absence as he was not
9
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getting any better. R. at 85. Mr. Davis testified that when he arrived at the shop, he
noticed two new employees were working at the shop. R. at 85. Mr. Davis testified
that he, his wife and the owner (Gary Gee) met and the owner told him that he was
"done around here." R. at 85. The Claimant testified he took that as meaning that the
owner had decided to discharge him so he took his plaques off the wall, got his tools,
and left. R. at 85. The owner did not seek to dissuade Mr. Davis in any way.
The Department's initial case adjudicator deemed the Employer to have
been the moving party in the separation and deemed Mr. Davis eligible for
unemployment insurance benefits. R. at 14-15. The Employer then appealed the
Department's decision. R. at 16-21. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that,
notwithstanding Mr. Davis' evidence and the inferences flowing from that evidence,
Mr. Davis had actually quit the job without good cause. R. at 116. The
Administrative Law Judge also ruled that it would be against equity and good
conscience to provide unemployment insurance benefits to Mr. Davis. R. at 118-119.
Mr. Davis appealed the Administrative Law Judge's decision to the Workforce
Appeals Board. R. at 121-126. The Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's
decision, holding that it would not disturb the Administrative Law Judge's findings
on credibility. R. at 134-139. This appeal ensued.
9. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
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Mr. Davis did not quit. Nevertheless, if he is deemed to have quit, the
Department should have allowed benefits under the equity and good conscience
standard. The Agency's findings of fact to the contrary are not supported by
substantial evidence and its conclusion of law to the contrary is not within the bounds
of reasonableness.
10. DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
Issue No. 1: Are the Agency's findings of fact on the issue of whether
Mr. Davis quit or was discharged supported by substantial evidence?
(A)

CITATIONS TO DETERMINATIVE STATUTES,

RULES OR CASES:
Utah Code, § 35A-4-405 (1), Utah Administrative Code, Rule
994.405-101, "Voluntary Leaving (Quit)-General Information," Rule 994405-201, "Discharge-General Definition," Rule 994-405-204, "Quit or
Discharge."
(B)

APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE

REVIEW, WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: The standard of review
applicable to appellate review of this administrative agency's findings of fact is
"substantial evidence." Kimball v. Dept. of Workforce Services, 2011 UT
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App. 259. Tasters, L.T.D., Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 863 P.2d 12
(Utah 1993), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154.
n Mr. Davis does challenge the Agency's finding of fact that he quit as not
being supported by substantial evidence.
Marshaling the Evidence in Favor of the Agency's Position
As to the issue of whether Mr. Davis quit or was discharged, the
evidence in favor of the Employer's/Agency's position was as follows:
The Employer filled out its own form on November 19, 2010
indicating that Mr. Davis had not had any contact with the shop from
November 9, 2010 to November 13, 2010 and, thus, had abandoned his job.
R. at 7. Four months later, the Employer filled out a Department form
indicating Mr. Davis just came in and picked up his tools and left. R. at 6.
After Mr. Davis filed his claim, the Employer then told the Department that
when Mr. Davis came in to the shop on November 13, 2010, he didn't talk to
Gary Gee but just picked up his tools and left. R. at 9, 20. During the hearing,
Mr. Gary Gee testified that he had no contact with Mr. Davis on November 13,
2010. R. at 62, 68. Gary Gee did not testify that Mr. Davis told him he was
quitting or that he submitted a letter of resignation. Dale Gee (Gary's son and
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the "manager" of the shop) testified Mr. Davis did not ever tell him (Dale Gee)
that he was quitting. R. at 72.
Claimant's Evidence
Despite this evidence (which the Administrative Law Judge found
credible and persuasive), Mr. Davis contends such evidence, in light of all the other
evidence, is not substantial enough to support a finding that Mr. Davis quit as
opposed to being discharged.
Mr. Davis testified he went in on November 13, 2010 to just talk to
Gary Gee about getting some sort of medical leave. R. at 85. He (Mr. Davis) saw
two guys working on the shop floor where he otherwise would have been working.
R. at 85. Gary Gee told him that he (Mr. Davis) was "done around there." R. at 85.
A few minutes later, on his way out of the premises, Mr. Davis told Dale Gee that he
had no intention of quitting, but had just been basically fired. R. at 86. Mr. Davis
testified that Mr. Dale Gee did not challenge what Mr. Davis told him. R. at 86.
Paula Davis corroborated Mr. Davis' narrative. R. at 97-102.
Where is the Employer's paper trail to negate any of this testimony?
One won't find it. Where is the letter going out from the Employer to Mr. Davis
informing him of a no-call/no-show abandonment of his position? One won't find it.
Where is Mr. Davis'letter of resignation? One won't find it.

13
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There is no dispute that in early November 2010, Mr. Davis suffered
some kind of injury. In this arena, the Administrative Law Judge did not need to (and
did not) determine whether Mr. Davis' injury had occurred on the job or off the job,
what the Administrative Law Judge needed to decide first was whether the Employer
terminated Mr. Davis1 employment or whether Mr. Davis had just "up and quit" his
job with no other job lined up for him to go to.
The Administrative Law Judge boiled this issue down to a factual
determination as to Mr. and Mrs. Davis' credibility vs. that of the Gees. That may be
the correct analytical framework, but the Judge misanalyzed the evidence bearing on
the issue of credibility.
The core factual issue was whether on November 13. 2010 . the
Employer fired Mr. Davis or whether Mr. Davis quit. The Judge spent a fair amount
of time in the hearing (and in his decision) discussing whether Mr. Davis was
physically able by himself to telephone his Employer the few days before November
13, 2010 (from November 9 to November 12, 2010). That issue does not relate to
whether Mr. Davis was fired or quit on November 13, 2010. Mr. Davis and Mrs.
Davis' testimony was that on the few days prior to November 13th, she made the calls
for Mr. Davis. As long as the Employer was informed as to Mr. Davis' work status
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(and inability to work-which is not disputed), it doesn't really matter whether Mr.
Davis was or was not able himself to place the phone calls. The Judge's emphasis on
whether Mr. Davis could have or should have made the calls himself on November 9
to November 12 seems like an effort to manufacture a credibility issue tangential to
the crucial fact issue as to what happened on November 13, 2010 .
What was important was making a credibility assessment as to the
conflicting testimony as to what happened on November 13, 2010 . On that issue, Mr.
Davis' testimony (as was his wife's testimony) was specific, consistent and coherent.
On that day, Mr. Davis had no intention of quitting and did not quit.
Other than the dispute about whether the injury was work-related, there
was no "bad blood" between the parties. Mr. Davis enjoyed his job and the Employer
testified that it liked Mr. Davis' work.
So the facts presented the Judge with two possible scenarios:
1.

Mr. Davis, who needs his job and who wants to establish that his
injury is work-related, and that he cannot work (temporarily),
doesn't ask for a leave of absence or more time off or make any
other arrangements to keep his job but just abruptly decides to
quit and so he goes to the office on November 13, 2010, to
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announce he is quitting, thus, leaving him no job and no income
and no possibility of income for a while; or
2.

Mr. Davis, who is asserting that his injury is work-related and
who, because of the injury, can't work (temporarily) and who is
searching for medical treatment so he can recover and return to
work, goes, in good faith, to his Employer on November 13,
2010 and asks for some type of medical leave of absence to keep
his job until he can get some medical treatment and get well
enough to return to work. The Employer, who is upset with the
employee for asserting the injury was work-related and for being
off work for several days, decides to end the employment
relationship, tells the employee that he is "done around there," so
the employee reasonably concludes he has been let go and so he
takes down his personal licenses and picks up his tools and
leaves and then files for unemployment insurance benefits.

In dealing with what happened on November 13, 2010, the
Administrative Law Judge's assessment of credibility went off the track.
Why then did the Judge accept the testimony of the owner (who
testified he had no contact with Peter Davis on that day) over that of Mr. Davis and
16
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his wife, who gave specific, consistent, coherent testimony as to what occurred on
November 13, 2010? That is the question.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Davis provided credible
reliable testimony that he was injured and was and had suffered serious neck/upper
extremity pain. The Administrative Law Judge also found that Mr. Davis was
embroiled in a controversy with the Employer as to whether the cause of the injury
was work-related or not.
It seems like the Administrative Law Judge was looking for ways to
challenge Mr. Davis' credibility and accepted the Employer's testimony carte blanche.
For example, the Administrative Law Judge cites that he has concerns about
claimant's credibility (but not the Employer's) because Mr. Davis was asserting his
injury was work-related, but the Employer's workers' compensation carrier had denied
the claim. That is a fairly common occurrence and such disputes are resolved through
the Utah Labor Commission workers' compensation hearing process. Why does a
garden variety dispute about whether an injury happened on the job or off the job cut
only against Mr. Davis' credibility? Did the workers' compensation carrier which
denied the claim interview any witnesses or conduct any other independent
investigation before it denied the claim? The record contains nothing to that effect.
So, the Administrative Law Judge should not have decided that the mere existence of
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such a common dispute renders Mr. Davis' evidence as to the events of November 13,
2010 non-credible.
Mr. Davis respectfully suggests the Administrative Law Judge just
missed the point on this issue of whether Mr. Davis quit or was discharged. The test
for voluntariness in whether an employee left employment is not the willingness of
the Employer that the employee keep working, but the willingness of the claimant to
continue working. Allen v. Dept. of Employment Security, 781 P.2d 888 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). Mr. Davis was willing to continue working if he was able to get the
treatment he needed to recover. Where is the sense in Mr. Davis quitting? Does he
think it better to have no job in his then current condition of being unable to work or
to have some job which might still be available to return to when he recovers?
Obviously, the latter.
Given Mr. Davis' vulnerable situation (health wise and financially), the
last thing in the world he wanted to do was lose his job by voluntarily quitting.
The Administrative Law Judge misanalyzed the core factual issue as to
which credibility was important, and as to that issue, misevaluated the factors bearing
on credibility. Mr. Davis undertook reasonable efforts to maintain daily, full contact
with his Employer (the Employer has no paper trail to the contrary). Mr. Davis acted
reasonably in going to the Employer's place of business on several occasions,
18
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including November 13, 2010, and trying to discuss what could be done, given his
health condition. The Employer did not reciprocate.
There is some evidence, but not substantial evidence, in support of the
proposition that Mr. Davis intended to quit or did quit. But Mr. Davis never
submitted a letter of resignation. Compare Kimball v. Department of Workforce
Services, 2011 UT App. 259. Mr. Davis did not fail to maintain contact with his
Employer. Compare Fragomeno v. Department of Workforce Services, 2011 UT
App. 100. And Mr. Davis did not tell any coworker that he was not coming back.
Compare Welte v. Department of Workforce Services, 2011 UT. App. 46. The
preponderance of the evidence suggests the dispute over whether Mr. Davis was
injured on the job and, therefore, entitled to workers' compensation benefits, changed
what had been a fairly harmonious and productive employer-employee relationship
into one that became adversarial. That directly led to Mr. Davis' discharge on
November 13, 2010. The Employer was the moving party in this separation. Under
Rule 994-405-201, that makes the separation a discharge.
The Employer testified it tried on only one occasion to talk to Mr.
Davis. R. at 61. It never sent him a warning, never sent him a notice and never tried
to talk with him on November 13. R. at 62.
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Perhaps the most revealing testimony of all was the owner's testimony
in response to the Administrative Law Judge's question:
JUDGE: If the Claimant would have come in on that
Saturday and spoken to you and informed you why he had
been gone that week and why he had not contacted you,
would he have been able to return to work?
G. GEE: That would have had to have been talked about
because it was way past the time when we would have
maybe figured out that it was-he had abandoned his job
{emphasis added).
JUDGE: Okay.
R. at 64.
In other words, by November 13, 2010, the Employer had decided to
separate Mr. Davis from employment. The weight of the evidence in the instant case
compels the conclusion that in this separation, the Employer was the moving party
TQP&

and thereafter that this separation was a discharge, not a quit.
Thus, Mr. Davis contends the Agency's finding that Mr. Davis quit is
not supported by substantial evidence.
Issue No. 2: Are the Agency's findings of fact on the issue of whether it
would be contrary to the equity and good conscience standard to deny unemployment
insurance benefits to Mr. Davis supported by substantial evidence?

20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(A)

CITATIONS TO DETERMINATIVE STATUTES,

RULES OR CASES:
Utah Code, § 35A-4-405 (1), Utah Administrative Code, Rule
994-405-103, "Equity and Good Conscience."
(B)

APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE

REVIEW, WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: The standard of appellate
review applicable to review of this administrative agency's findings of fact is
"substantial evidence." Tasters, L.T.D., Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security,
863 P.2d 12 (Utah 1993), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154.
Mr. Davis does challenge the Agency's finding that to award him
unemployment insurance benefits would have been against the equity and good
conscience standard.
Marshaling the Evidence in Favor of the Agency's Position
The Employer's evidence that Mr. Davis did not have good cause to quit
and that denying benefits would be contrary to the equity and good conscience
standard would be the same as for the discharge vs. quit dispute set forth in Issue No.
1, above.
Certainly, there is some evidence that Mr. Davis did not act
"reasonably" during November 9 to 12 or act reasonably on November 13. Mr. Davis
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acknowledged he himself was too incapacitated by pain and medication to call his
Employer from November 9 to November 12. (He testified he did direct his wife to
make calls to his Employer.) The Employer's evidence was that on November 13,
2010, Mr. Davis just came into the shop and, without stating he was quitting, took
down his licenses, picked up his tools and left.
Claimant's Evidence
Despite this evidence, Mr. Davis contends such evidence, in light of all
the other evidence, is not substantial enough to support a finding that Mr. Davis acted
unreasonably and, therefore, should be denied benefits under the equity and good
conscience standard.
Mr. Davis did not seek to establish good cause for quitting his job
because he didn't quit his job. Likewise, Mr. Davis did not fail to explore all options
prior to quitting his job because he did not quit his job. But even if the Department
decided he did quit his job, he acted reasonably in doing so.
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Davis acted
reasonably, as defined in Rule 994-405-103 (2) (b). Mr. Davis did not overreact to a
misunderstanding. Compare Kimball v. Department of Workforce Services, 2011
UT App. 259. Mr. Davis did not appear to be unusually sensitive and just left after a
disagreement with management. Compare Martinez v. Department of Workforce
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Services, 2011 UT App. 273. Mr. Davis did not fail to maintain contact with the
Employer. Compare Fragomeno v. Department of Workforce Services, 2011 UT
App. 100. Mr. Davis never acknowledged that on his last day he was told that his
employment was not being terminated. Compare Welte v. Department of Workforce
Services, 2011 UT App. 46. Mr. David did not quit, but even if the finding that he
did quit remains operational, his decision to do so was sensible under the
circumstances. He thought the owner had just discharged him. That belief was
reasonable under the circumstances.
Thus, Mr. Davis asserts that the Agency's finding that he did not act
reasonably and that, therefore, to award him unemployment insurance benefits would
be contrary to the equity and good conscience standard is not supported by substantial
evidence.
Issue No. 3: Is the Agency's conclusion of law that Mr. Davis should be
denied unemployment insurance benefits erroneous, arbitrary, capricious or does it
constitute an abuse of discretion or is it otherwise contrary to the Agency's past
decisions and practice or outside the bounds of reasonableness and rationality?
(A)

CITATIONS TO DETERMINATIVE STATUTES,

RULES OR CASES:
Utah Code, § 35A-4-405 (1).
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(B)

APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE

REVIEW, WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: The standard of appellate
review applicable to review of this administrative agency's conclusions of law
is "reasonableness." The appellate court accords intermediate deference to the
agency's determinations of law and reviews the matter under a reasonableness
standard, Prosper Team, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Services, 2011 UT
App. 246, Arrow Legal Solutions Group v. Workforce Services, 2007 UT
App. 9, 146P.3d830.
The Agency's conclusion of law that Mr. Davis should be denied
unemployment insurance benefits was not a reasonable conclusion.
Marshaling the Evidence in Favor of the Agency's Position
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that because Mr. Davis had
not maintained full contact himself with the Employer from November 9 to
November 12 and that he had failed to pursue all options prior to quitting, Mr. Davis
had not acted reasonably and the Department could not allow benefits under the
"lower" standard of equity and good conscience.
Claimant's Evidence
The Administrative Law Judge made Mr. Davis' eligibility hinge on Mr.
Davis' efforts to stay in touch with the Employer between November 1 and November
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13. It is true that as to that issue, some of the testimony was in dispute. But it is also
true much of the testimony as to the many contacts Mr. Davis had with the Employer
during that time frame was not disputed.
DAVIS EVIDENCE
Date in Question

GARY GEE EVIDENCE
Date in Question

Record Page

Record Page

November 1

78

November 1

November 2

79

November 2

November 3

Day Off

November 3

54,60

November 4

79

November 4

60

November 5

80-81

November 5

60

November 6

81

November 6

November 8

82

November 8

November 9-12
November 13

(in dispute)
85-86

November 9-12
November 13

61
(in dispute) 61
62

The point is that the parties did not dispute that Mr. Davis had communication with
the shop on several days between November 1 and November 13. That contact
manifested Mr. Davis? intent to remain employed. That effort by Mr. Davis
manifested a continuing attachment to his job. He never changed his mind. He never
decided abruptly to quit.
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The equity and good conscience standard is meant to be a "lower"
standard than good cause to quit. See Rule 994-405-101:
"If good cause is not established, the claimant's
eligibility must be considered under the equity and
conscience standard."
The Agency's decisions make meeting such a standard as difficult as meeting the
good cause to quit standard.
Mr. Davis did nothing to forfeit his right to claim unemployment
insurance compensation. The Agency's final decision manifested little sensitivity to
Mr. Davis' medical condition. The Agency's decision reflected inadequate
consideration of Mr. Davis' efforts to keep in touch with his Employer through one
means or another during the November 1 through November 13 time period.
Furthermore, the Agency's final decision manifested inadequate consideration of the
Employer's lack of effort to stay in touch with Mr. Davis during the November 1 to
November 13 time frame. Therefore, the Agency's decision that to deny Mr. Davis
eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits would be an equitable result was not
within the bounds of reasonableness or rationality.
CONCLUSION
The Agency's decision represents yet another subtle tip of the scales
toward employers.
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Whether Mr. Davis was fired or quit on November 13, 2010 presented,
to a large degree, a question of credibility.
And as to that issue, the evidence basically resulted in a tie. The tie
should have gone to the claimant.
With this Agency, credibility determinations are no longer resolved on
the basis of a tie going to the employee claimant (construing such social welfare
legislation liberally), but seem to be invitations to the Agency to try to search the
record for some basis upon which to discredit the employee. But the Agency does not
seem to apply the same searching inquiry to the Employer's evidence. Never mind
that disputes as to workers' compensation claims are common place. Never mind that
the Employer usually controls most of the witnesses. Never mind that an employer
who is experienced in thwarting claims for unemployment insurance benefits can
succeed in establishing the elements of the just cause standard (or lack of good cause
to quit standard) by testimony which is vague and self serving. Never mind that,
absent mental incompetence on the part of an employee, an employer can always
argue that an employee could have done things differently.
The Court needs to bring the scales back into balance. Mr. Davis asks
this Court to reverse the Agency's decision, hold that Mr. Davis did not quit (or, if it
does not disturb the Agency's finding that Mr. Davis quit), hold that such a decision
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would not be disqualifying under the equity and good conscience rule. Thus, Mr.
Davis requests the Agency to award benefits or remand for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.

lis ^L_
& day of December, 2011.
DATED this

Davi
Attorney fok.

lant/Petitioner
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WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Department of Workforce Services
Division of Adjudication

Issue 02

PETER A. DAVIS, CLAIMANT
S.S.A. No. XXX-XX-4005

:
:

FIRST CHOICE EMISSIONS &
INSPECTIONS, EMPLOYER

Case No. ll-B-00840

:

DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed.
Benefits are denied.
The Employer is eligible for relief of benefit charges.
HISTORY OF CASE:
In a decision dated May 26,2011, Case No. 11-A-07233-R, the Administrative Law Judge reversed
a Department decision and denied unemployment insurance benefits to the Claimant effective
March 6, 2011. The Employer, First Choice Emissions & Inspections, was found eligible for relief
of benefit charges in connection with this claim.
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto.
CLAIMANT APPEAL FILED: June 15, 2011.
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
OF UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT:
1.

Did the Claimant have good cause to quit his employment pursuant to the provisions of
§35A-4-405(l)?

2.

Is it contrary to equity and good conscience to deny unemployment insurance benefits
pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-405(l)?

3.

Is the Employer eligible for relief of charges pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-307(l)?

FACTUAL FINDINGS:
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Claimant worked for this Employer for three years. He quit his employment by failing to report
to work for a week and then coming in to pick up his tools and plaques. The Administrative Law
Judge denied benefits and the Claimant filed this appeal.
The Claimant argues that he did not quit his employment but was discharged when he was unable
to work due to an injury. The Claimant testified that he hit his head on a concrete beam at work on
Monday, November 1, 2010. He testified that he told the owner's son, Dale, about the injury at
2:30 p.m. that day but agreed he could stay until the end of the day. He testified that he called the
Employer on November 2 to report that he would not be in due to the injury. Wednesday,
November 3, was the Claimant's day off He testified he and his wife drove to the Employer's place
of business on November 4 to tell the Employer he could not work. The Claimant testified that he
went in instead of calling because "dealing with these guys [the owner and his son] on the phone isn't
very punctual or nice. You're better off if you show up and let them see you in the condition you're
in." The Claimant testified he and his wife returned to the shop on November 5 to again say the
Claimant was too ill to work.
The Claimant testified that on November 5 the owner suggested the Claimant see the owner's
chiropractor. The owner called and made arrangements for the visit and told the Claimant the
chiropractor would not charge him. The Claimant went for a treatment that day. While the Claimant
was still in the chiropractor's office, the chiropractor called the owner. The Claimant testified he
could not hear all of the conversation but the chiropractor advised the Claimant to return to light duty
work on Monday, November 8.
The Claimant had a second treatment with the chiropractor on Saturday, November 6. After that
appointment the Claimant went into work and told the owner he could not work the rest of the day.
During the hearing, the Claimant originally denied telling the owner he would return to work on
Monday, November 8. When the Claimant was reminded on cross-examination that he told the
Department representative he did tell the employer he would return on Monday, the Claimant
admitted he must have told the owner he would be back on Monday.
The Claimant testified that on Sunday, November 7, he went to an InstaCare facility and was
prescribed pain killers, muscle relaxers, and an anti-inflammatory. The Claimant testified that on
Monday, he and his wife went to the shop and told the owner he was still unable to work. The
Claimant's wife testified that she called the Employer Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday
of that week to report the Claimant could not work. The Claimant's wife testified the Claimant did
not make the telephone calls because he was too ill to hold a phone to his ear. The Claimant testified
he could have made the calls himself if his wife had brought him the telephone. The Claimant's wife
did not explain why she would have called in on Wednesday since that was the Claimant's day off
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The Claimant testified that on Saturday, November 13,2010, he and his wife went to see the owner
to ask for a leave of absence as he was not getting better. The Claimant testified that the three of
them met and the owner told him that he was "done around here." The Claimant testified that he
noticed two new employees. The Claimant testified he thought that meant he had been fired so he
took his plaques off the wall, got his tools, and left.
The owner and his son also testified. The owner testified that the Claimant first appeared to be in
pain on November 4, the day after his day off. The owner testified that on that day he talked to the
Claimant about whether he could finish the day and the Claimant said he could. The owner testified
that the Claimant called on November 5 and said he was unable to work. The owner offered to set
up an appointment with the owner's chiropractor and the Claimant accepted. The owner testified that
the chiropractor called him later in the day and told him the Claimant needed a couple of days off
but could return to light duty work on Monday, November 8. The owner testified that during the
telephone conversation with the chiropractor, he heard the chiropractor talk to the Claimant and the
Claimant say he would be in on Monday. The owner testified he did not hear from or about the
Claimant again until Saturday, November 13. On that date the owner testified he did not talk to the
Claimant but did see him come in and pick up his plaques and tools and leave.
The owner's son testified that the Claimant worked on November 1 and 2 without incident and first
appeared to be hurt on Thursday, November 4,2010. The son testified that he talked to the Claimant
that day thinking something had happened on his day off. The son testified that he did not hear from
or about the Claimant again until Saturday, November 13. The son testified that when he saw the
Claimant that day he asked "what was going on" and the Claimant replied "I'm hurt. I'm here for my
tools." The son testified the Claimant took his license and tools and left. The owner and son both
testified that the Claimant did not say he was injured on the job. The first time either of them knew
the Claimant allegedly hurt himself on the job was on Tuesday, November 16, 2010, when the
Claimant's wife called the son for information about the Employer's workers' compensation
insurance.
Unemployment insurance hearings, like many adversarial hearings, involve two or more opposing
parties who purport to have the only accurate version of events, yet whose stories differ—sometimes
significantly. For this reason, a judge is tasked with the responsibility to hear testimony, consider
evidence, and then determine which party is most credible. In other words, determine which version
of events is most likely true. Since the Administrative Law Judge is in the unique position of being
an active participant in the hearing, interacting with the parties and also questioning the witnesses,
the Administrative Law Judge's credibility finding will not be disturbed on appeal. If there is
evidence in the record to support the credibility finding made by the Administrative Law Judge, the
Board will not substitute its own judgment for that of the Judge unless there is a clear showing of
error.
Here the Administrative Law Judge found that the Employer's witnesses were more credible than
the Claimant and his witness. There is ample evidence in the record to support that finding. A
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review of the record going back to when the Claimant first filed his claim shows that the Employer's
version of the events has been consistent throughout. The Claimant's testimony during the hearing
was different from what he originally told the Department. Additionally, the Claimant knew that he
should contact the Employer personally instead of having his wife call and his story that he was too
ill or drugged up to telephone between November 8 and 13 is not credible. According to the
Claimant he was well enough to go into the shop on November 8 and 13 but too disabled to talk on
the phone the four days in between. There is no showing of error in the credibility finding.
The Administrative Law Judge quoted the quit and equity rules in his decision in full and those rules
are not reproduced here. The Claimant argues on appeal that the Claimant's wife called the
Employer each day he missed work. The Administrative Law Judge did not find that testimony
credible and the Board agrees with that credibility finding. According to what the Employer knew,
the Claimant had agreed to return to work on Monday, November 8, and then was not heard from
again until he picked up his tools and plaques on Saturday, November 13. The owner denies the
Claimant asked for a leave of absence and denies that he or anyone else said anything to the Claimant
that could be construed as a discharge. Neither the Claimant nor his wife contacted the Employer
between November 5 and November 13. When the Claimant returned on November 13 it was to
pick up his tools and plaques. The Claimant's actions are consistent with a finding of voluntary quit.
The Claimant did not show good cause for quitting. While it appears the Claimant may not have
been able to work that week, he has not provided any medical documentation to show he was unable
to perform light duty work. Additionally, he has failed to show that he could not call the Employer
to keep the Employer informed about his whereabouts. Employers have the right to expect that
employees will report to work when scheduled or call in. The Claimant did neither. While working
might have been a hardship the Claimant could not control or prevent due to his injury, the
Claimant's testimony about why he did not call the Employer is not credible. The Claimant did not
have good cause for quitting.
A denial of benefits is not an affront to fairness. While it is admitted the Claimant may have been
experiencing some pain during this period of time, he did not adequately explain why he did not stay
in touch with his Employer. His testimony and the testimony of his wife is not credible. There are
no extenuating circumstances of the type contemplated by equity which will allow for an award of
benefits. It was not reasonable for the Claimant to have failed to call his Employer during the week
in question and pick up his tools effectively quitting.
The reasoning and conclusions of law of the Administrative Law Judge are adopted in full.
DECISION:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying benefits to the Claimant effective March 6,
2011, pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-405(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act, is
affirmed.
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The Employer, First Choice Emissions & Inspections, is eligible for relief of benefit charges in
connection with this claim, as provided by §35A-4-307(l) of the Act.
APPEAL RIGHTS:
Pursuant to §63G-4-302(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 3 00 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to each party
by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an order within
20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered to be
denied pursuant to §63G-4-302(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. It is not
necessary to file a request for reconsideration if you intend to appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals. If a request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue
another decision. This decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of
Appeals and time limitation for such an appeal.
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board,
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment
Security Act; §63G-4-401 oftheUtah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 ofthe Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules
9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ORCE APPEALS BOARD

Datelssued: July 14,2011
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on
this 14th day of July, 2011, by mailing the same, postage prepaid,
United States mail to:
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2885 W BEDFORD RD
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119
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ATTORNEY AT LAW
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DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
APPEALS UNIT
Decision of Administrative Law Judge

Appellant

Respondent

FIRST CHOICE EMISSIONS AND
INSPECTIONS LLC

PETER A DAVIS
2885 W BEDFORD RD
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119

5310 S STATE ST
MURRAY UT 84107

S.S.A. NO:

:ASENO: 1KA-07233-R
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APPEAL DECISION:

The request to reopen the hearing is granted.
Benefits are denied.
The Employer is relieved of charges.

CASE HISTORY:
Original Hearing Date:
Date of Appeal Decision:
Request for Reopening Dated:
Appearances:
Issues to be Decided:

April 26,2011
April 25,2011
April 29,2011
Claimant / Employer
R994-508-117 and R994-508-118 - Failure to Appear
35A-4-405(2)(a) - Discharge
35A-4-405(l)
- Voluntary Quit
35A-4-307

-

Employer Charges

The original Department decision allowed unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds the Claimant
was discharged without just cause. That decision also charged the Employer's benefit ratio account for
benefits paid to the Claimant.
APPEAL RIGHTS: The following decision will become final unless, within 30 days from May 26,2011,
further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, UT
84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://www.jobs.utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the grounds
upon which the appeal is made.
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
Failure to Appear
The original hearing in this matter was scheduled for April 26, 2011. The Appeals Unit does not have a
record of the hearing notice being sent to the Employer. The Employer did not receive written notice of the
hearing in the mail. As a result, the Employer did not participate in the hearing. An Order of Default was
issued against the Employer on April 25,201L The Employer filed its request to reopen the hearing on
April 29,2011.
Separation
Prior to filing a claim for unemployment insurance benefits effective March 6, 2011, the Claimant last
worked for First Choice Emissions and Inspections LLC from March 2007 to November 13, 2010. The
Claimant was separated from the Employer for the reasons described below.
In early November 2010 the Claimant complained to the Employer that he was suffering some pain in his
neck and back. By November 5,2010, the Employer had the Claimant see a chiropractor the Employer was
acquainted with. The Claimant saw the chiropractor who made some adjustments to the Claimant's neck
and back. The Employer discussed with the chiropractor when the Claimant would be able to return to work.
There was some discussion while the Claimant was in the office with the chiropractor that the Claimant may
be able to return to work on Monday, November 8,2010.
On November 8, 2010, the Claimant informed the Employer he was still in a lot of pain and would not be
able to work that day. The Claimant indicated that he believed he would be able to return to work the
following day. He did not return to work the following day on November 9, 2010, and did not work the
remainder of that week.
The Claimant traveled to the Employees place of business on November 13, 2011, and informed the
manager he could no longer work anymore because he was injured- The Claimant took his certificate off
the wall and took his tools and left. The Employer did not hear from the Claimant after that point.
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Failure to Appear
The unemployment insurance rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-406(3) of the Utah Employment Security
Act provide, in pertinent part:
R994-508-117.

Failure to Participate in the Hearing and Reopening the Hearing
After the Hearing Has Been Concluded.

(1)
If a party fails to appear for or participate in the hearing, either personally or
through a representative, the ALJ may take evidence from participating parties and will issue
a decision based on the best available evidence.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(2)
Any party failing to participate, personally or through a representative, may
request that the hearing be reopened.
(3)
The request must be in writing, must set forth the reason for the request, and must
be mailed, faxed, or delivered to the Appeals Unit within ten days of the issuance of the
decision issued under Subsection (1). Intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays
are excluded from the computation of the ten days in accordance with Rule 6 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. If the request is made after the expiration of the ten-day time limit,
but within 30 days, the party requesting reopening must show cause for not making the
request within ten days. If no decision has yet been issued, the request should be made
without unnecessary delay. If the request is received more than 30 days after the decision is
issued, the Department will have lost jurisdiction and the party requesting reopening must
show good cause for not making a timely request...
(5)
The ALJ may reopen a hearing on his or her own motion if it appears necessary
to take continuing jurisdiction or if the failure to reopen would be an affront to fairness.
R994-5G8-118.

What Constitutes Grounds to Reopen a Hearing.

(1)
The request to reopen will be granted if the party was prevented from appearing
at the hearing due to circumstances beyond the party's control.
(2)
The request may be granted upon such terms as are just for any of the following
reasons: mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the decision. The determination of what sorts of neglect will be
considered excusable is an equitable one, taking into account all of the relevant
circumstances including:
(a)

the danger that the party not requesting reopening will be harmed by reopening;

(b)
the length of the delay caused by the party's failure to participate including the
length of time to request reopening;
(c)
the reason for the request including whether it was within the reasonable control
of the party requesting reopening;
(d)

whether the party requesting reopening acted in good faith;

(e)
whether the party was represented at the time of the hearing. Attorneys and
professional representatives are expected to have greater knowledge of Department
procedures and rules and are therefore held to a higher standard; and
(f)
whether based on the evidence of record and the parties' arguments or statements,
taking additional evidence might effect the outcome of the case.
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(3)
Requests to reopen are remedial in nature and thus must be liberally construed in
favor of providing parties with an opportunity to be heard and present their case. Any doubt
must be resolved in favor of granting reopening.
(4)
Excusable neglect is not limited to cases where the failure to act was due to
circumstances beyond the party's control
(5)
The ALJ has the discretion to schedule a hearing to determine if a party
requesting reopening satisfied the requirements of this rule or may, after giving the other
parties an opportunity to respond to the request, grant or deny the request on the basis of the
record in the case.
In this case the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts warrant a reopening of the hearing to allow
all parties the opportunity to be heard, and the failure to participate in the hearing falls within the definition
of excusable neglect. There is no record the Employer ever received the notice of the hearing in the mail.
Without having notice of the hearing, the Employer could not have known of the time and date of the
hearing and could not have participated in the hearing. Therefore, the Employer's request to reopen the
hearing is granted.
Separation
The Administrative Law Judge finds the Claimant was the moving party in the reason for his separation from
the Employer. During the hearing both parties provided conflicting testimony regarding the circumstances
leading to the Claimant's separation. The Administrative l^aw Judge found the Employer's testimony to be
more credible and reliable than the Claimant's testimony. The Administrative Law Judge found the Claimant
did not provide credible testimony when he testified that from Tuesday, November 9 through Friday,
November 12,2010, he was physically unable to call the Employer to inform and update the Employer of
his health status. The Claimant had been to the Employer's place of business on November 8 and also
November 13, which severely damages the Claimants credibility that in between that time, he was literally
physically unable to pick up the phone and make a call to the Employer. The Claimant's wife testified the
Claimant was in and out of bed, and in and out of sleep during this time. If the Claimant could get out of
bed at any time even to use the restroom, he could have made a phone call to the Employer. The
Administrative Law Judge also had a concern that the Claimant denied telling the Employer that he would
come to work on Tuesday, November 9, when the Department records show the Claimant informed the
adjudicator that he did tell the Employer he would try to come into work that day. The Administrative Law
Judge will base the Claimant's eligibility on the law and rules governing separations due to a voluntary quit.
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-405(l) of the Utah Employment Security
Act provide, in pertinent part:
R994-405-1QL

Voluntary LeaviDg (Quit) - General Information,

(1)
A separation is considered voluntary if the claimant was the moving party in
ending the employment relationship. A voluntary separation includes leaving existing work,
or failing to return to work after:
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(a)
an employer attached layoff which meets the requirements for a deferral under
R994-4G3-108b(l)(c),
(b)

a suspension, or

(c)

a period of absence initiated by the claimant

(2)
Failing to renew an employment contract may also constitute a voluntary
separation.
(3)
Two standards must be applied in voluntary separation cases: good cause and
equity and good conscience. If good cause is not established, the claimant's eligibility must
be considered under the equity and good conscience standard.
R994-405-102.

Good Cause.

To establish good cause, a claimant must show that continuing the employment would
have caused an adverse effect which the claimant could not control orprevent. The claimant
must show that an immediate severance of the employment relationship was necessary.
Good cause is also established if a claimant left work which is shown to have been illegal
or to have been unsuitable new work.
(1)

Adverse Effect on the Claimant.

(a)

Hardship.

The separation must have been motivated by circumstances that made the continuance
of the employment a hardship or matter of concern, sufficiently adverse to a reasonable
person so as to outweigh the benefits of remaining employed. There must have been actual
or potential physical, mental, economic, personal or professional harm caused or aggravated
by the employment. The claimant's decision to quit must be measured against the actions of
an average individual, not one who is unusually sensitive.
(b)

Ability to Control or Prevent.

Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect on the claimant, good cause will not
be found if the claimant:
(i)

reasonably could have continued working while looking for other employment,

(ii)
had reasonable alternatives that would have made it possible to preserve the job
like using approved leave, transferring, or making adjustments to personal circumstances,
or,
(iii)
did not give the employer notice of the circumstances causing the hardship
thereby depriving the employer of an opportunity to make changes that would eliminate the
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need to quit An employee with grievances must have made a good faith effort to work out
the differences with the employer before quitting unless those efforts would have been futile.
(2)

Illegal

Good cause is established if the claimant was required by the employer to violate state
or federal law or if the claimant's legal rights were violated, provided the employer was
aware of the violation and refused to comply with the law.
(3)

Unsuitable New Work.

Good cause may also be established if a claimant left new work which, after a short trial
period, was unsuitable consistent with the requirements of the suitable work test in rule
R994-405-306. The fact the claimant accepted a job does not necessarily make the job
suitable. The longer a job is held, the more it tends to negate the argument that the job was
unsuitable. After a reasonable period of time a contention the quit was motivated bv
unsuitability of the job is generally no longer persuasive. The Department has an affirmative
duty to determine whether the employment was suitable, even if the claimant does not raise
suitability as an issue.
Although the Claimant provided credible testimony that he was injured and suffered some serious pain that
prohibited him from working for a period of time, the Claimant has not established that he pursued all
reasonable alternatives to quitting. The Administrative Law Judge was not persuaded the Claimant
attempted to seek a medical leave of absence in order to preserve his employment, The Employer denied
the Claimant ever sought to have a medical leave of absence. The Administrative Law Judge further has
some concerns about the Claimant's credibility when he claimed his injury occurred at work, but the
Claimant had been denied a workman's compensation claim. The Claimant has not established good cause
for quitting his job.
R994-4Q5-103.

Equity and Good Conscience. .

(1)
If the good cause standard has not been met, the equity and good conscience
standard must be considered in all cases except those involving a quit to accompany, follow,
or join a spouse as provided in R994-405-104. If there are mitigating circumstances, and a
denial of benefits would be unreasonably harsh or an affront to fairness, benefits may be
allowed under the provisions of the equity and good conscience standard if the claimant:
(a)

acted reasonably.

The claimant acted reasonably if the decision to quit was logical, sensible, or practical.
There must be evidence of circumstances which, although not sufficiently compelling to
establish good cause, would have motivated a reasonable person to take similar action, and,
(b^

demonstrated a continuing attachment to the labor market.

A continuing attachment to the labor market is established if the claimant took positive
actions which could have resulted in employment during the first week subsequent to the
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separation and each week thereafter. An active work search, as provided in R994-403-113c,
should have commenced immediately after the separation whether or not the claimant
received specific work search instructions from the Department. Failure to show an
immediate attachment to the labor market may not be disqualifying if it was not practical for
the claimant to seek work. Some circumstances that may interfere with an immediate work
search include illness, hospitalization, incarceration, or other circumstances beyond the
control of the claimant provided a work search commenced as soon as practical.
There are no mitigating circumstances that would cause a denial of benefits to be unduly harsh or an affront
to fairness. The Claimant did not act reasonably by failing to maintain full contact with the Employer and
failing to pursue all options prior to quitting his job. Because the Claimant did not act reasonably, an
allowance of benefits cannot be granted under the equity and good conscience provision.
An employer may be relieved of charges when the claimant was separated from employment for reasons
which would have resulted in a denial of benefits under Section 35A-4-405(l) or Section 35A-4-405(2) of
the Utah Employment Security Act. In this case the reason for the Claimant's separation is disqualifying;
therefore, the Employer is relieved of charges.
DECISION AND ORDER:
Failure to Appear
The request for reopening of the hearing is allowed in accordance with provisions of Paragraphs R994-508117 and R994-508-118 of the unemployment insurance rules for Section 35A-4~406(3) of the Utah
Employment Security Act.
Separation
The Department representative's decision allowing unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to Section
35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act is reversed. Benefits are denied pursuant to Section
35A-4-405(l) of the Act effective March 6, 2011, and continuing until the Claimant returns to bona fide
covered employment, earns six times her weekly benefit amount and is otherwise eligible.
Employer Charges
The Employer is relieved of liability for charges in connection with this claim, as provided by Section 35A4-307 of the Utah Employment Security Act.

Hr^im
Gar/6. Gibbs
Admini$&ative Law Judge
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
Issued;
GG/tc

May 26,2011
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Reproduction of parts of the record of central importance
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G. GEE

Pretty close. A couple of years, yeah.

JUDGE

All right. And do you know what his last day of work was?

G. GEE

No, not without looking it up.

JUDGE

Now it looks like the Employer had provided on Exhibit Number 5 the date of
November 4 th of 2010. Does that sound about right?

G.GEE

That's about right.

_

JUDGE

What was the Claimant's job title at the time of separation?

G. GEE

Job title? He was a Mechanic and a Emission Tech.

JUDGE

All right. Do you know what his rate of pay was?

G.GEE

His rate of pay was $12.50 an hour.

JUDGE

Okay. What I would like for you to do at this time, Mr. Gee, is to provide testimony
and simply explain the circumstances that led to him no longer working for your
company.

G.GEE

I already did that on paper, but okay.

JUDGE

I want your testimony under oath in the hearing today.

SCOFFIELD

That's why we're here, Gary, is so you can tell them that.

G.GEE

I'm not going to be very clear because my mind is not very clear this morning. I'm
dizzier then a bat. But I'll do the best I can. Okay. He was supposed to come in after
his day off. He did not do so. And he came in and said that he was - had been hurt.
Okay.

JUDGE

Okay. Hold on one moment. He was supposed to come in on his day off, but he didn't
and then you said -

G.GEE

No, no, no, after his day off, no. He came in and said he was hurt.

JUDGE

Okay.

G.GEE

Okay. And that was after his day off. And so I said, well, you know, how bad - he
said he couldn't move his arm, or whatever. So I says, well, I will get you a - if you're
that bad, why don't I get a friend of mine, was a chiropractor - 1 said, I'll get him to do
12
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HOLDSWORTH I should also mention that in my office is a Paula Davis, who is Mr. Davis's wife, and
she may be a possible witness.
JUDGE

Okay.

HOLDSWORTH His daughter, or their daughter, is here as well. But she is not expected to be a witness.
JUDGE

Okay. All right. Thank you for letting me know and let the record reflect that as well.
And if she does testify, we'll sequester her while the Claimant is providing testimony,
but she can sit in while the Employer provides testimony. Mr. Gary Gee, are you
there?

G. GEE

I am.

JUDGE

Is anyone else in the room with you?

G. GEE

We have - but they're gone now.

JUDGE

Okay. So Mr. Gee, again going back to your testimony from last time, what I would
like to do at this point is provide testimony and simply explain to the best of your
knowledge and recollection the circumstances that led to the Claimant, Mr. Davis, no
longer working for your company. Just - so just go ahead and explain that to the best
of your knowledge and recollection.

G. GEE

Okay. First of all, thanks for postponing this for a little bit while I -

JUDGE

No problem. Your welcome.

G. GEE

Okay. Let's see, go back to I guess Tuesday, the day before his day off, he left that
night to go home. We said, good night. Have a good - have a good day off. He left.
Wednesday was his day off. Thursday he came in and he was complaining of his
shoulder or his neck being hurt. So I said, well, you know, if you're really hurt why
don't you go home. And he said, no - he refused to go home. So then a little later I
heard Dale, my son, say; Pete, if you're really hurting, why don't you go home. And he
refused again.
So then he finished the day out. Then Friday he called in and said he was really
hurting. So I said, well Pete, if you're hurting that bad you probably need to go have
something done. So I said, I'll make arrangements with my chiropractor that I use and
I'll see if he'll do it for free. So I called Dan Guthrie and made arrangements. And he
said, yes, he would do that. So then got in touch with Pete and Pete said, okay, he
would go out.
So a little later Dan called me with - and Pete was in the background talking with him.
18
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So he gave him permission to talk to me about it. And Dan said his shoulder was hurt
but he thought he could come back maybe Monday and do light work. And I said,
okay, that's fine. So anyway, then Monday he didn't show up. Okay. He called that
afternoon. I can't tell you exactly what time. But he called that afternoon and said;
Gary, I couldn't come out. I will be in tomorrow for sure. Okay. That would have
been on Tuesday. Now Tuesday, nothing. He didn't show up. Then on WednesdayJUDGE

Hold on one moment. Did he call anyone on Tuesday?

G. GEE

No. No. No. He did not.

JUDGE

Okay.

G.GEE

On - then on Wednesday, nothing. On Thursday, nothing. And then on - and then
actually on Friday, nothing. So all three days I did not hear from him.

JUDGE

So did anyone for the Employer try to contact him during that time?

G.GEE

No. No. No.

JUDGE

Why not?

G.GEE

Why we didn't try to call him?

JUDGE

Right.

G.GEE

Because we didn't have anyway of getting a hold of him.

JUDGE

Didn't have a phone number or anything?

G.GEE

Yes, we tried once, but he - no - no answer. So nobody was able to get a hold of him.

JUDGE

Do you know when it was tried to contact him?

G.GEE

No, because it was - we were really busy because I only had one person, because my
son has been hurt, so he couldn't work. And so - and my son was the last that we had,
so I was really - 1 was really, really shirt. So I was really working - 1 cannot tell you
what time it was. I would guess in the afternoon, because that was usually when it
slows down a little bit.

JUDGE

The afternoon of what day?

G,GEE

What day? It would have been Thursday.

•0
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JUDGE

The afternoon on Thursday the Employer tried to call him but there was no answer?
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G. GEE

Yeah, no answer.

JUDGE

Okay. If the Claimant was unable to work for whatever reason, was there a policy or
procedure that he needed to follow as far as contacting the Employer?

G. GEE

Oh yeah. We got it - it's posted right on the bulletin board that you have to call in and
tell us what's going on. And if you're absent more than two days then you have to
bring in a doctor's note.

JUDGE

All right.

G.GEE

And I didn't go into any of it because I - I did not know at this time that he was
supposed to be an accident on the (inaudible), which - so I didn't - he didn't have to
follow the procedures that we would have followed. It would have been - been on an
accident. Because we would have - if it had been an accident he would have had to
have gone to First Med, gone through all the drug testing and all that stuff.

JUDGE

All right. So then he said he would be in for certain on Tuesday. He didn't come in or
call Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday or Friday. Then what happened?

G.GEE

Well, Saturday morning he came in and - first I knew - 1 was at the counter. He come
across with two other - with two other fellows with a ladder that he had brought and
asked me if it was okay if he just crawled up and got his licenses off the wall. Got
down. Took the ladder down, walked out and - and left the office. He exited the
waiting room. And I had - Dale was out in the back, so I wasn't really worried about about what was going on. So the next thing I know, he's driving out the driveway with
his tools in the back of his truck. And nothing -

JUDGE

Did you speak to him that day when he came in?

G.GEE

No, not - 1 didn't have a chance to say anything.

JUDGE

So were you watching him when he got the ladder to get the licenses?

G.GEE

Yes. Well, I was - 1 was waiting on customers and -

JUDGE

Okay.

G.GEE

I was watching him go across - across the - the showroom.

JUDGE

Did he say anything to you that day?
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JUDGE

Okay. All right. Then what happened?

G. GEE

That's it I mean -

JUDGE

Did you ever have any contact with him after that?

G. GEE

Only - then later on, about a few days later, his wife called and said, who is your
insurance carrier? And I said, well, what do you need that for? And - let's see, what
did I tell him - oh what I tell - 1 said, what do you need that for? And she said, well,
because we need to make a claim from Pete getting hurt. And I said, Pete getting hurt.
When did he get hurt? She's like, well - no, we didn't. This is the first I've heard of it.

JUDGE

Hold on one moment. Is it possible to move to a location where we don't have so much
background noise?

G. GEE

Let me call them and have them take the - that's my grandkids.

JUDGE

Okay. That's fine. But they're just making-

G. GEE

Yeah, hang on just a second and I'll see if I can get the guys - they're in the other
room. Hang on and I'll tell them.

JUDGE

Are you there, Mr. Gee?

G. GEE

Okay. They are gone.

JUDGE

Okay. All right. So his wife called in a few days after he came in and she asked about
insurance because of a possible on the job injury.

G. GEE

Yeah.

JUDGE

Okay. Did you ever hear from him about anything about his job?

G.GEE

Nothing.

JUDGE

Okay.

G. GEE

We were going to bring him back and put him on light duty, but that never - never was
able to happen because I never got a chance to talk to him.

JUDGE

All right. Did anyone to your knowledge inform the Claimant by any means that he
had been terminated from his employment?
21
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G. GEE

I'm sorry? Say that again.

JUDGE

To your knowledge, did anyone for the Employer communicate to the Claimant, to Mr.
Davis, that he had been terminated?

G.GEE

No, they wouldn't have the authority to do that.

JUDGE

And you did not do that either?

G.GEE

I did not do that. No, sir.

JUDGE

If the Claimant would have come in on that Saturday and spoken to you and informed
you why he had been gone that week and why he had not contacted you, would he have
been able to return to work?

G.GEE

That would have had to have been talked about because it was way past the time when
we would have maybe figured that it was - he had abandoned his job.

JUDGE

Okay.

G.GEE

But - but that wouldn't have may not have taken place either because we kind of liked
his work, so we would have probably put him on light duty and tried to salvage things.

JUDGE

After this Saturday incident in which you saw him come in and use the ladder to take
the license off the wall and drive away with his tools, did you try to call him after -

G.GEE

I didn't actually see him drive away with the tools.

JUDGE

Okay.

G.GEE

I just know after I got through with the people in the - that I was waiting on that he was
gone. Okay. And I asked Dale what happened. He said he just picked up his tools and
he was gone.

JUDGE

All right. Did you ever try to call him after that?

G.GEE

No. No, I did not. I just figured he didn't want anything to do with us, so -

JUDGE

Did you have any idea why he didn't want to have anything to do with you?

G.GEE

No. No. There was no way I'd have any idea of that.

JUDGE

All right. Any other testimony that you would like to provide regarding the reason for
the Claimant's separation from the Employer?
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G.GEE

I don't know. What else could there be? We didn't fire him. He just didn't show up
for work. He didn't try to contact us. I don't know what else - what else there could
be.

JUDGE

Did he ever submit any doctor's note or medical documentation for you?

G.GEE

No. No. Nothing. Absolutely nothing. And he had done that previously at other times
when he had been off for a couple of days, so he knew that that was our policy.

JUDGE

All right. Mr. Scoffield, questions for Mr. Gee?

SCOFFIELD

Yes. Gary, now in - on Exhibit 22, the - can you look at that exhibit?

G.GEE

No, I don't -

SCOFFIELD

It's from Guthrie Chiropractic.

G.GEE

I don't have it. Let me - let me - can I -

SCOFFIELD

Well, your wife - well, I can ask - let me ask you some questions about it. I don't need
to actually have you look at it. Now when you originally - when did you originally
learn that he was injured?

G. GEE

When did I originally learn?

SCOFFIELD

Yeah, when did you - when did you learn —

G.GEE

On Thursday when he came back to work from his day off.

SCOFFIELD

Okay. So that was - so I think that was the 4th. There were some dates that were kind
o f - 1 think — I think wrong. People just -just looks like they put some of the wrong
dates down. So it was Thursday, the 4th?

G.GEE

Yes.

SCOFFIELD

Is that correct? And he - so at that point you told him; hey, go in to see my
chiropractor and you - that was on you?

G.GEE

No, no, no, no. That's the day I told him to go home and see if he'd get better.

SCOFFIELD

Okay. And so then when did you - what happened on Friday?

G. GEE

Friday. That was Friday.
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SCOFFIELD

Okay.

G. GEE

Friday he called me and told me that he was - he was - that his shoulder was hurting
and he was hurting pretty bad. So that's when I told him let's get - get him ready for
you to go see Mr. -

SCOFFIELD

Okay. So he went in - he went in, had him work - you let him take the day off on the
4th because he told you -

G.GEE

No, no, he wouldn't go home.

SCOFFIELD

Oh, so he stayed on the 4th?

G.GEE

He stayed on the 4 th .

SCOFFIELD

Okay. And then on the 5th he called and said; I'm in too much pain. On the 4th did he
ever tell you he had been injured on the job?

G.GEE

No, no, no.

SCOFFIELD

Okay. Did he tell anybody else where he was injured?

G.GEE

Not to my knowledge, no.

SCOFFIELD

Okay.

G.GEE

Nobody ever told me that he did.

SCOFFIELD

Okay. So on Friday you asked him - you said, let's go in and see this chiropractor and
see if we can get you in -

G.GEE

No, no, I didn't say that - I says; I'll make arrangements for you to go in.

SCOFFIELD

Okay. So you made arrangements and he did go in?

G.GEE

Yes.

SCOFFIELD

Okay.

G.GEE

I called in and said; will you do it for free, because this fellow didn't have a lot of
money. He says, okay, I'll do that for you.

SCOFFIELD

Okay. And this is one of your friends, Dan Guthrie?
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CLAIMANT

$12.50.

JUDGE

All right. What I would like for you to do, Mr. Davis, is to provide testimony and
simply explain to the best of your knowledge and recollection why you are not - why
you no longer work for the Employer. Just go ahead and explain.

CLAIMANT

Like from the 1st forward?

JUDGE

From any point that relates to why you no longer work for the Employer. Just go ahead
and explain and make sure you get closer to the speaker phone and make sure you
speak up.

CLAIMANT

Okay. On November 1st of 2010,1 had banged my head on the concrete beam that
morning. By 2:30 p.m. I -

JUDGE

Hold on one moment. There was some interference. You banged your head on what?

CLAIMANT

On a concrete beam. It was in the basement. It's part of the ceiling where the stairwell
comes up onto the rack for changing oil.

JUDGE

All right. And go ahead. Continue.

CLAIMANT

By 2:30 that afternoon I went in the office and told Gary that I was in pain in my upper
back and shoulders and he asked me at that point; are you going to be able to make it
through day? And I said, well gosh, Gary, it's just you and me here (inaudible). I'll go
ahead and hang out for the rest of the day and complete my job for the day.

JUDGE

Did you tell him why you had pain in your shoulder?

CLAIMANT

Yes, I did.

JUDGE

What did he say?

CLAIMANT

I was told -

HOLDSWORTH No, what did you tell him?
CLAIMANT

Oh, what did I tell Gary?

JUDGE

What did you tell him about how you - why you were hurting?

CLAIMANT

Okay. I told him that I had - I had hit my head again on that same stupid concrete
beam down there. And he asked me if I was okay. And I told him; I guess so. You
know, not much I can do about it. It's done and over with.
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JUDGE

All right. Then what happened?

CLAIMANT

And then he asked me if I could make it through the rest of the day. I told him I would.
And I completed that day of work.

JUDGE

All right. Then what happened?

CLAIMANT

Then on the 2 nd my wife called in sick to him and let him know that I was pretty bad
and told her to go ahead and take the day off. The 4th was my day off.

JUDGE

Okay. What about the 3rd?

CLAIMANT

The 3 rd was my day off. The 4th is the next following day that the wife called into the
shop and told Gary that - or actually me and the wife drove to the shop that morning
and talked to Gary and he sent me home because of the pain. And then on the 5th -

JUDGE

Okay. Hold on. Hold on. Hold on.

CLAIMANT

Okay.

JUDGE

The 2 nd your wife called in indicating you were not able to come into work; correct?

CLAIMANT

Correct.

JUDGE

And was that as a result of hitting your head?

CLAIMANT

Correct.

JUDGE

All right. And then the 3 rd was your day off?

CLAIMANT

Correct.

JUDGE

The 4th you are saying you went into work that day?

CLAIMANT

The wife drove me down to the shop to talk to Gary.

JUDGE

Okay. And tell me about that conversation.

CLAIMANT

To let him know that I was still in really bad pain and everything. And he told me;
well, if I was to go ahead and go home. So I went home. And then on the 5th I came
back to the shop and that's when Gary says; well, I've got my personal chiropractor I
can send you to and if you're in that much pain you need to have something done, so.

JUDGE

So were you - did you comeback to the shop on the - well, I'm sorry. Let me go back
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just a moment. Why did you go to the shop on the 4th?
CLAIMANT

Because trying dealing with these guys on the phone isn't very punctual or nice.
You're better off if you show up and let them see you in the condition you're in.

JUDGE

All right. Well, on the 4th when he sent you home did you give any indication of
whether or not you would be back the following day?

CLAIMANT

I told him that I would try. I mean, all the way through this it's been a matter o f - 1 you know, I want my job. I want to come back. I'll try to be there. And that's what I
always stayed with. I mean, if I could have gotten out of this and been healed in a few
days I would have been back to work.

JUDGE

So then you go back to the shop on the 5th. Did your wife drive you there?

CLAIMANT

Yes, she did.

JUDGE

Why did you go back on the 5th?

CLAIMANT

To see Gary once again, as I explained about talking to them on the phone. And that's
when Gary said that he'll send me to Mr. Guthrie.

JUDGE

And did you see Mr. Guthrie on the 5th?

CLAIMANT

Yes, I did. Went in and he did an adjustment on me and called Gary and told me that I
would be laid up for a few days and him and Gary had some sort of conversation.
When they got off the phone, Dan Guthrie told me that I had to be very careful because
Gary is the type of guy that would get rid of me. He said I'd be best off if I tried to go
to work on Monday. And I asked Dan at that time if he really think I'll be able to. And
he says, I really can't tell you if you will or won't. And so we left Dan Guthrie -

JUDGE

Hold on. Hold on. Hold on. Were you present when Mr. Guthrie was speaking to
Gary on the phone about you returning to work?

CLAIMANT

We were in his lobby. We were - me and the wife were sitting across over on a couple
of chairs and he was talking to Gary over on the other side of the counter over there.
So I didn't exactly hear the entire conversation between the two.

JUDGE

Did Mr. Guthrie discuss to you about returning to work on Monday on light duty?

CLAIMANT

No, he did not. All he said was it would be in my best interest, due to the way Gary is,
to make sure that I tried to go to work on Monday.

JUDGE

All right. Did you see the doctor, or Mr. Guthrie, on Saturday, the 6th?
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CLAIMANT

Yeah, I did. But let me finish with on the 5th.

JUDGE

Sure. Go ahead.

CLAIMANT

At that time Dan Guthrie told me that Gary was no longer going to pay for anymore of
these sessions and so I had to pay Dan out of my own pocket at that point. And so and that same day, me and the wife drove back to the shop to talk to Gary, because I
was concerned about my job. And Gary at that time told me that Dan didn't have any
right to tell me I couldn't go to work. And Gary went ahead and sent me home.

JUDGE

This is still on the 5th? I'm sorry, Mr. Davis, was this still on the 5th?

CLAIMANT

Yes, it was. It was on the 5ti

JUDGE

So what do you mean he sent you home? You weren't there to work anyway; were
you?

CLAIMANT

No, no, no. But I'm just saying he told me to go ahead and go home.

JUDGE

Okay.

CLAIMANT

Because you know, as far as I'm concerned, he's your Employer and if you're during
work hours you would need his permission to be at home.

JUDGE

Okay. So you spoke to him. He said that Mr. Guthrie had no business telling you you
couldn't come back. Was there a discussion that you would be back on Monday?

CLAIMANT

I told Gary that I would try. In fact, Gary wanted me to try to be there Saturday, and I
told him that I would try. It's just with this condition, it has not allowed me to do much
of anything.

JUDGE

All right. Did you go to work on Saturday?

CLAIMANT

Okay. On Saturday we went from our home to Guthrie's office and then drove back to
the shop to talk to Gary and then Gary went ahead and sent me home on Saturday.

JUDGE

Why don't you tell me about the discussion on Saturday?

CLAIMANT

It was just a matter of I'm in pain. You know, what - what can we do. And he told
me; well, there's not much you can do; and he sent me home.

JUDGE

Did you tell him you were not in a condition to work?

CLAIMANT

Well, I told him I was in extreme - extreme pain. I mean, it was obvious. I was able to

s
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hold myself forward looking at the floor while speaking to Gary because I wasn't able
to sit straight up.
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JUDGE

All right. Then what happened after that Saturday?

CLAIMANT

Okay. That following Sunday, which is the 7th, the wife took me over to Instant Care
and seen Doctor Heaton (phonetic), who evaluated me at that time and prescribed me
muscle relaxers, pain relievers and anti-inflammatory. And he at that time told me not
to work. On Monday, the 8th, me and the wife drove to Guthrie's once again and that's
when Dan Guthrie told me he wasn't paying for it anymore.

JUDGE

Hadn't he already told you that last Friday or the Saturday?

CLAIMANT

No, that was actually the 8th when he told me that. I'm sorry.

JUDGE

Okay.

CLAIMANT

It's been quite a while.

JUDGE

So you went to see Mr. Guthrie. He said Mr. Gee would no longer pay. Then what
happened?

CLAIMANT

Okay. So we returned to the shop and talked to Gary.

JUDGE

On Monday, the 8th you returned and spoke to him?

CLAIMANT

I did, so he could see my condition once again. I was told at that time that we were just
a welfare case and that he didn't want me there, to go home, that he didn't want me to
be around there to get hurt anymore. I then told Gary that for the rest of the week that
we'll be in search of some good help for me to try to get me some help.

JUDGE

Okay. Hold on. What was your understanding about what he was saying about going
home? Was he - was he telling you to go home, your job was over, or just to go home
that day or what?

CLAIMANT

I felt that he was telling me to go home until my condition improved that he didn't
really want me there. Now I didn't take it as - as he had fired or terminated me at that
point.

JUDGE

Can you recall exactly what he said on Monday?

CLAIMANT

On Monday, the 8th? It was - it was that he didn't want me to get any worse and you
know, by being around there and to just go home.
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JUDGE

All right. Did he say anything else that you can recall?

CLAIMANT

No, sir.

JUDGE

All right. Did you go to work on Tuesday, the 9th?

CLAIMANT

No, I did not.

JUDGE

Did you go into the shop to speak to Gary or call Gary or anyone?

CLAIMANT

No, because from the 9th through the 12th the wife was busy trying to find me help,
trying to get Workman's Compensation numbers and things like this. She was busy on
the phone trying to take care of things, (baby crying) call from anybody during the
week from First Choice Emissions to find out how I was doing, if my condition was
improving.

JUDGE

Well, why didn't you just call?

CLAIMANT

I was laid up in bed, sir.

JUDGE

Couldn't your wife had handed you the phone in bed?

CLAIMANT

We have a phone that's on a -

JUDGE

Are you telling me you could not have spoken on the phone that day?

CLAIMANT

It would have been - 1 guess I could have -

JUDGE

I mean, what happened between Monday when you went in and spoke to him and then
Tuesday where you couldn't get - even talk on the phone?

CLAIMANT

Well, I - 1 felt that not being - not to be there as long as I'm in that kind of pain and me
explaining to Gary that we were going to try to find help and Gary sending me home,
he knew what we were doing.

JUDGE

How did he know that you would not be sufficiently better by Tuesday and that you
couldn't come in?

CLAIMANT

Because I hadn't improved in almost a week. He had seen me almost every day on my
working days unable to really -

JUDGE

Right, and so your testimony you've made such a point to make sure he's informed by
actually going in and speaking to him in person all of these days, and then Tuesday you
don't go in or you don't call him at all. I'm trying to understand why.
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CLAIMANT

Okay. Myself, like I said, I was - I was medicated. I was in bed. The wife was
chasing down trying to get me help because this condition was not improving any. I
mean, this was excruciating extreme pain. The wife, after us hearing what Gary had
said, went directly after trying to get me medical help that I am still as of now even not
gotten correct medical help.

JUDGE

Are you saying that you were physically unable to speak on the phone that day?

CLAIMANT

I guess I could if the wife was able to bring me the phone and if I was coherent enough
to do so.

JUDGE

Now didn't the medications help at all?

CLAIMANT

Yes, they put me to sleep.

JUDGE

But you weren't asleep 24 hours a day; were you?

CLAIMANT

A lot.

JUDGE

All right. So did you go to work on Wednesday?

CLAIMANT

No, I did not.

JUDGE

Did you call or go into to talk to Gary on Wednesday?

CLAIMANT

From Monday through - through Friday, pretty much whatever the wife took care of,
whatever the phone calls were - I was in my - in my bedroom and she was in the
business office taking care of things. I really don't have any real recollection of that
entire week other then Monday.

JUDGE

So what your - your condition had worsened since you saw - went to Instant Care?

CLAIMANT

That's when Instant Care put me on the narcotics and things and made it where I was in
and out of it and sleeping most of the time. I'm not somebody that takes that type of
medication. And the pain that I was in was more that I could physically or mentally
handle.

JUDGE

So you have no recollection of whether you or your wife spoke to the Employer either
by telephone or in person from Tuesday through Friday?

n

CLAIMANT

Correct.
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JUDGE

Then what happened?
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CLAIMANT

And then on the 13th after I - on the 12th I know that I went and seen Doctor Albred
(phonetic) and he done some adjustments on me and took 13 x-rays and went through
me pretty heavily. On the 13th I went in to talk to Gary about medical leave of absence.
And I was just told then; well, you're done around here. Now when we pulled up in
front of the building before we went in the office I noticed that they had two guys
already on the floor working, which at that shop that's usually about all the more that
works there is two guys on the floor, unless you have one guy that's being replaced. So
they do not keep three on the floor at a time.
But on the 13th when we got there, me and the wife went in the office and talked to
Gary and that's when he told me that I was done around there after I spoke to him about
trying to get a medical leave of absence.

G. GEE

Can he - I'm having a hard time hearing him. Can he get closer to the speaker phone?

JUDGE

Yeah, make sure that you speak up if you could, Mr. Davis.

CLAIMANT

Okay.

JUDGE

You spoke with Gary on the 13th. Tell me again to the best of your recollection exactly
what he said.

CLAIMANT

Okay. When I - when I went in -

JUDGE

Make sure you speak up. We're still having a problem hearing you.

CLAIMANT

When I went in to the office on the 13th I talked to Gary and asked him if I could
possibly get some medical leave because this isn't getting any better and I don't know
when I'll be able to get myself together enough to be able to come in. And he told me
not to worry about it that I was just done around there. Now I've heard this phrase used
before with other employees and it pretty much means you're terminated. When
they're done with you, they say so.

JUDGE

Did you ask him if you were terminated?

CLAIMANT

No, by knowing how they are and what that means, I mean, you know, you're done
around here. I don't know where that leaves much other explanation. I mean, I'd try
and get smacked in the face worse.

JUDGE

Was anyone present when you had this conversation with Mr. Gee?

CLAIMANT

Yes, my wife was.

JUDGE

Was - did you speak to Dale Gee on the 13 ?
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CLAIMANT

Yes. After we were done talking to Gary and he told me I was done around there, 1 had
my son and his friend bring in the ladder to take down my plaques off the wall and I
was standing out front there and Dale brought the vehicle that he is building for his
wife around the building. And that's when he talked to me. And I just told him that his
dad had told me I'm done around there. So I guess I'll just take my tools and go. And
I was never told any otherwise, never called and told anything different then that. So
Dale knew at that point that I felt I was terminated by what was said.

JUDGE

Did you intend to quit your job?

CLAIMANT

No, sir.

JUDGE

All right. Did you know that when each day that you're absent that the Employer
would want to know why you were not coming to work?

CLAIMANT

If it - as long as they had proof and full knowledge of why you weren't at work, they
were satisfied with that. I mean, their own friend, Dan Guthrie, said that I was in a
serious situation. And me going in and talking to Gary and him seeing me in my
condition, I don't see where it warrant anything but; gosh, this guy is messed up and we
feel bad for him and we wish we could get him back on his feet so he could work here.

JUDGE

Well, wasn't there some discussion between Mr. Guthrie and Mr. Gee that you would
be returning on the 8th?

CLAIMANT

I, like I said, I didn't hear all that was said between him and Dan.

JUDGE

But you did - your testimony was that Mr. Guthrie told you that if he were you he
would - you would go - he would go back to work on Monday.

CLAIMANT

Yeah, because of the threat of maybe losing my job.

JUDGE

All right. S o -

CLAIMANT

I was in no condition to do so, sir, or I would have.

JUDGE

And you did not believe that the Employer wanted you to contact them on Tuesday
through Friday, the 9th through the 12th to let - give them updates on your condition?

CLAIMANT

No, I was never asked to do so and we were on a verbal understanding of what was
transpiring that week.

JUDGE

At some point did you start looking for other full-time work?

CLAIMANT

No, sir.
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. Jive completed calendar quarters prior to the week he
files a valid claim, or he can use those wages paid
during the first four of the last five completed calendar
quarters prior to the date of his illness or injury that
caused the claimant to leave his work and file for
workers* compensation.
References: 35A-4-404.
History; 12028, AMD, 10/04/91; 14954, AMD,
12/02/93; 15301, NSC, 01/01/94; 18993, AMD,
08/12/97; 19283, SYR, 05/29/97; 22829, NSC, 05/25/
2000; 23825, AMD, 10/29/2001.

R994-405. Ineligibility for Benefits.

358

R994-405-4O8. Strike Caused by Employer Non-Compliance with State or Federal Laws.
R994-405-409. Period of Disqualification.
R994-405-410, Wages Used to Establish Claim as
Provided by Subsection 35A-4-405X4Xc>.
R994-405-411. AvailabiUty.
R994-405-412. Suitability of Work Available Due to a
Strike.
R994-405-413. Strike Benefits.
R994-405-501. Fraud - General Definition.
R994-405-502. Elements of Fraud,
R994-405-503. Evidence and Burden of Proof
R994-405-504. Disqualification and Penalty.
R994-405-505. Repayment.
R994-405-506. Future Eligibility.
R994-405-507. Examples.
R994-405-701. Payments Following Separation
General Definition.
R994-405-702. Elements.
R994-405-703. Period of Disqualification.
R994-405-704. Disqualifying Separations.
R994-405-705. Base Period Wages.
R994-405-SG1, Services 4n Education Institutions ^
General Definition.
R994-405-803.
R994-405-802. Elements Required for Denial.
R994-405-804. Educational Institution (School).
tion.
Employee for an Educational InstituR994-405-805. Reasonable Assurance,
R994-405-806. Substitute Teachers,
R994-405-807. Period of Disqualification,
R994-405-808. Retroactive Payments.
R994-4O5-10O1 Aliens - General Definition.
R994-405-1002. Alien Status.
R994~405~1003. Lawfully Admitted for Permanent
Residence.
R994-405-1004. Lawfully Present for the Purpose of
Performing Services.
R994-405-1005. Permanently Residing in U.S. Under
Color of Law.
R994-405-1006. Section 1182(dX5XA) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
R994-405-1007. Procedural Requirements.
R994405-1008. Preponderance of Evidence.
R994-4O5-1O09. Availability for Work.
R994-405-1010. Periods of Ineligibility.

R994-405-101. Voluntary Leaving - General Information.
R994-405-102. Good Cause.
R994-405-103 Equity and Good Conscience.
R994-405-104. Quit to Accompany, Follow or Join a
Spouse.
£994-405-105, Evidence and Burden of Proof. — R994-405-106. Quit or Discharge.
R994-405-107. Examples of Reasons for Voluntary
Separations.
R994-405-10& Effective Date of Disqualification.
R994-405-201. Discharge - General Definition.
R994-405-202. Just Cause.
R994-405-203. Burden of Proof.
R994-405-204. Quit or Discharge,
R994-405-205. Disciplinary Suspension.
R994-405-206. Proximal Cause - Relation of the Offense to the Discharge,
R994-405-207. In Connection with Employment.
R994-405-208. Examples of Reasons for Discharge.
R994-405-2Q9. Effective Date of Disqualification.
R994-405-210. Discharge for Crime - General Definition.
R994-405-211. In Connection with Work.
R994-405-212. Dishonesty or Other Disqualifying
Crimes.
R994-405-213. Admission or Conviction in a Court,
R994-405-214. Disqualification Period.
R994-405-215. Deletion of Wage Credits.
R994-405-301. Failure to Apply for or Accept Suitable
R994305^101. Voluntary Leaving - General InWork - General Definition.
formation.
R994-405-302. Necessary Elements.
A separation is considered voluntary if the claimant
R994-405-303. Provisions for Allowance of Benei
was the moving party in ending the employment^
After an Issue is Found to Exist.
relationship^ voluntary separation includes leaving
R994-405-304, Failure to Accept a Referral.
*"""B"xjstmg work or failing to return to work after a
R994-4G5-305. Proper Application.
layoff, suspension, or period of absence. Failing to
R994-405-306. Failure to Accept an Offer of Work.
renew an employment contract may also constitute a
R994-405-307. Good Cause.
voluntary separation^ ^6~sTOIdards must be applied |
R994-405-308, Equitv and Good Conscience.
In~voTurKary separation cases: good cause and equity
R994-405-30& Suitability of Work
and good conscience. If good cause is not established,
the claimant's eligibility must be considered under the
R994-405-310. Examples.
equity and good conscience standard.
R994-405-311. New Work.
R994-405-3I2. Burden of Proof,
R994-405-102. Good Cause.
R994-405-313.
R994-405-4G1. Period of Ineligibility.
l b establish good cause, a claimant must show that
R994-405-314.
R§94_405-402. Notification.
continuing employment would have caused an adStrike - General Definition.
cation.
verse effect which the claimant could not control or
Necessary
Disqualifi- prevent. The claimant must show an immediate sevR994-405-403. Elements
Unemployment
Due tofora aStrike.
R9S4-405-404. Workers at Factory or Establishment erance of the employment relationship was necessary.
of the Claimant s Last Employment.
Good cause is also established if a claimant left work
R994-405-405. Fomented by the Employer.
which is shown to have been illegal or to have been
R994-405-406. Work Stoppage.
unsuitable new work.
R994-405-4O7 Grade, Group or Class of Worker.
(1) Adverse Effect on the Claimant.

5V- <__**—
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(a) Hardship,
The separation must have been motivated by circumstances that made the continuance of the employment a hardship or matter of concern, sufficiently
adverse to a reasonable person to outweigh the benefits of remaining employed. There must have been
actual or potential physical, mental, economic, personal or professional harm caused or aggravated by
the employment. The claimant's decision to quit must
be measured against the actions of an average individual, not one who is unusually sensitive.
(b) Ability to Control or Prevent.
Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect
on the claimant, good cause may not be established if
t h e claimant:
(i) reasonably could have continued working while
looking for other employment, or
(ii) had reasonable alternatives that would have
made it possible to preserve the job. Examples include
using approved leave, transferring, or making adjustments to personal circumstances, or,
(iii) did not give the employer notice of the circumstances causing the hardship thereby depriving the
employer of an opportunity to make changes that
would eliminate the need to quit. An employee with
grievances must have made a good faith effort to work
out the differences with the employer before quitting
unless those efforts would have been ftitile.
(2) Illegal.
Good cause is established if the individual was
required by the employer to violate state or federal
law or if the individual's legal rights were violated,
provided the employer was aware of the violation and
refused to comply with the law.
(3) Unsuitable New Work.
Good cause may also be established if a claimant
left new work which, after a short trial period, was
unsuitable consistent with the requirements of the
suitable work test in Subsections 35A-4~405<3Kc) and
35A-4~40oX3Xe). The fact a job was accepted does not
necessarily make the job suitable. The longer a job is
held, the more it tends to set the standard by which
suitability is measured. After a reasonable period of
time a contention that the quit was motivated by
imsuitability of the job is generally no longer persuasive.

R894-405-106

The claimant acted reasonably if the decision to quit __
was logical, sensible, or practical. There must be
evidence of circumstances which, although not sufficiently compelling to establish good cause, would have
motivated a reasonable person to take similar action.
Behaviors that may be acceptable to a particular
subculture do not establish what is reasonable.
(c) Continuing Attachment to the Labor Market.
A continuing attachment to the labor market is
established if the claimant took positive actions which
could have resulted in employment during the first
week subsequent to the separation and each week
thereafter. Evidence of an attachment to the labor
market may include: making contacts with prospectiveemployers, preparing^^ j^esumes, and developing
job leads. An active work search should have commenced immediately subsequent to the separation
whether or not the claimant received specific work
search instructions from the Department. Failure to
show an immediate attachment to the labor market
may not be disqualifying if it was not practical for the
individual to seek work. Some examples of circumstances that may interfere with an immediate work
search include illness, hospitalization, incarceration,
or other circumstances beyond the control of the
claimant provided a work search commenced as soon
as practical.
R994-405-1Q4, Quit to Accompany, Follow or Join
a Spouse.
If an individual quit work to join, accompany, or
follow a spouse to a new locality, good cause is not
established. Furthermore, the equity and good conscience standard is not to be applied in this circumstance. It is the intent of this provision to deny
benefits even though a claimant may have faced
extremely compelling circumstances including the
cost of maintaining two households and the desire to
keep the family intact.
R994-405-105. Evidence and Burden of Proof,
The claimant was the moving party in a voluntary
separation, and is the best source of information with
respect to the reasons for the quit. The claimant has
the burden to establish that the elements of good
cause or of equity and good conscience have been met.

R994-405-106. Quit or Discharge.
R994-405-103. Equity and Good Conscience.
(1) Refusal to Follow Instructions.
(1) If the good cause standard has not been met, the
If the claimant refused or failed to follow reasonable
equity and good conscience standard must be applied requests or instructions, and knew the loss of employin all cases except those involving a quit to accom- ment would result, the separation is a quit.
pany, follow, or join a spouse as outlined in Section
(2) Leaving Prior to Effective Date of Termination.
R994-405-104. If there were mitigating circum(a) If an individual leaves work prior to the date of
stances, and a denial of benefits would be unreason- an impending reduction in force, the separation is
ably harsh or an affront to fairness, benefits may be voluntary. Notice of an impending layoff does not
allowed under the provisions of the equity and good establish good cause for leaving work. However, the
conscience standard if the following elements are duration of available work may be a factor in considsatisfied:
ering whether a denial of benefits would be contrary to
(a) the decision is made in cooperation with the equity and good conscience. If the claimant is not
employer,
disqualified for quitting under Subsection 35A-4(b) the claimant acted reasonably;
405dKa), benefits shall be denied for the limited
(c) the claimant demonstrated a continuing attach- period of time the claimant could have continued
ment to the labor market.
working, as there was a failure to accept all available
(2) Hie elements of equity and good conscience are work as required under Subsection 35A-4-403(lXc).
defined as follows:
(b) An individual may not escape a discharge dis(a) In Cooperation with the Employer.
qualification under Subsection *35A-4-405< 2 Ha) by
A decision is made in cooperation with the employer quitting to avoid a discharge that would result in a
when the Department gives the employer an opportu- denial of benefits. In this circumstance the separation
the Howardinformation.
W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reubenshall
ClarkbeLaw
School, BYU.
nity toDigitized
provideby
separation
adjudicated
as a discharge.
Machine-generated
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(8) Health or Physical (Condition.
(a) Although it is not essential for the claimant to
have been advised by a physician to quit, a contention
that health problems required the separation must be
supported by competent evidence. Even if the work
caused or aggravated a health problem, if there were
alternatives, such as treatment, medication, or altered working conditions to alleviate the problem,
good cause for quitting is not established.
(b) If the risk to the health or safety of the claimant
was shared by all those employed in the particular
occupation, it must be shown the claimant was affected to a greater extent than other workers. Absent
such evidence, quitting was not reasonable.
(9) Retirement and Pension.
—Voluntarily leaving wor^s^ejyto accept retirement
benefits is not a compelling reason for quitting,within
the meaning of the Act. Although it may have been
reasonable for an individual to take advantage of a
retirement benefit, payment of unemployment benefits in this circumstance is not consistent with the
intent of the Unemployment Insurance program, and
a denial of benefits is not contrary to equity and good
conscience,
(10) Sexual Harassment.
(a) A claimant may have good cause for leaving if
the quit was due to discriminatory and unlawful
sexual harassment, provided the employer was given
a chance to take necessary action to alleviate the
objectionable conduct. Sexual harassment is a form of
sex discrimination w?hieh is prohibited by Title VII of
the United States Code and the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act.
(b) *Sexual harassment* means unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature when:
(i) submission to the conduct is either an explicit or
implicit term or condition of employment, or
(ii) submission to or rejection of the conduct is used
as a basis for an employment decision affecting the
person, or
(iii) the conduct has a purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a person's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment.
(c) Inappropriate behavior which has sexual connotation but does not meet the test of sexual discrimination is insufficient to establish good cause for leaving work.
(11) Discrimination.
A claimant may have good cause for leaving if the
quit was due to prohibited discrimination, provided
the employer was given a chance to take necessary
action to alleviate the objectionable conduct. It is a
violation of federal law to discriminate against employees regarding compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of race, color, religion, sex, age or national origin; or to limit, segregate,
or classify employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive them of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect their employment status
because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex?
age or national origin.
(12) Voluntary Acceptance of Layoff.
If an employer notifies employees that a layoff is
going to take place and the employer gives the employees the option to volunteer for the layoff, those
who do volunteer are separated due to reduction of
force regardless of incentives.

R994-405-202

ever, to avoid any confusion which may arise when a
disqualification is made for a period of time prior to
the filing of a claim, the claimant shall be notified
benefits are denied beginning with the effective date
of the new or reopened claim, The disqualification
shall continue until the claimant returns to work in
bona fide covered employment and earns six times his
or her weekly benefit amount. A disqualification that
begins in one benefit year shall continue into a new
benefit year unless purged by subsequent earnings.
Severance or vacation pay may not be used to purge a
disqualification,
R9S4-405-201. Discharge - General Definition. \
A separation is a discharge if the employer was the I
moving party in deternaining_thedate the employ-}
ment ended.|Benents shall be denied if the claimant
was discharged for just cause or for an act or omission
in connection with employment, not constituting a
crime, which was deliberate, willful, or wanton and
adverse to the employer's rightful interest. However,
not every legitimate cause for discharge justifies a
denial of benefits. A just cause discharge must include
some fault on the part of the worker. A reduction of
force is considered a discharge without just cause at
the convenience of the employer.

R994 405-202. J u s t Cause.
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the
following three elements must be satisfied:
(1) Culpability.
The conduct causing the discharge must be so
serious that continuing the employment relationship
would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If
the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment
and there was no expectation that it would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown.
The claimants prior work record is an important
factor in determining whether the conduct was an
isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment. A
long term employee with an established pattern of
complying with the employer's rules may not demonstrate by a single violation, even though harmful, that
the infraction would be repeated- In this instance,
depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may
not be necessary for the employer to discharge the
claimant to avoid future harm.
(2) Knowledge.
The worker must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer expected. There does not need to be
evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the employer,
however, it must be shown that the worker should
have been able to anticipate the negative effect of the
conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be established
unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the
expected behavior or had a written policy, except in
the case of a violation of a universal standard of
conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the
worker had knowledge of the expected conduct. After
a warning the worker should have been given an
opportunity to correct the eibjeetionable conduct. If the
employer had a progressive disciplinary procedure in
place at the time of the separation, it generally must
have been followed for knowledge to be established,
except in the ease of very severe infractions, including
criminal actions.
(3) Control,
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have
R994-405-108. Effective Date of Disqualification. been within the claimant s control, isolated instance?*
A disqualification under this section technically of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment are
notClark
sufficient
to establish
just cause for discharge.
begins Digitized
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i ^ ^ B k > l f i r>rson in a similar circumstance may
?ati5'fv the element of control if the claimant had the
ability to perform satisfactorily.
(b) H i e Department recognizes t h a t in order to
maintain efficiency it may be necessary to discharge
workers who do not meet performance s t a n d a r d s .
While such a circumstance may provide a basis for
discharge, this does not mean benefits will be denied.
To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a
discharge due to unsatisfactory work performance, it
must be shown t h a t the claimant had t h e ability t o
perform t h e job duties in a satisfactory manner. In
g e n e r a l if the claimant made a good faith effort to
meet t h e job requirements but failed to do so d u e to a
lack of skill or ability and a discharge results, just
cause is not established.
R994~405*203. B u r d e n of Proof.
In a discharge, t h e employer initiates t h e separation, and therefore, h a s the burden to prove there was
j u s t cause for discharging t h e claimant. The failure of
one p a r t y to provide information does not necessarily
result in a ruling favorable to the other party. Interested parties h a v e the right to rebut information
contrary to their interests,
R994-405-204. Q u i t o r mschw^T~
^ ^ s .
The circumstances of the separation a s found by t h e
Department, determine whether it was a quit or
discharge. The conclusions on the employer s records,
the separation notice or the claimants report a r e not
controlling on the Department.
J
-^ CI) Uiscnarge before Effective Date of Resignation.
(a> Discharge.
If an individual notifies the employer of a n intent to
leave work on a definite date, but is separated prior to
t h a t date* the reason the separation took place on t h e
d a t e t h a t it did, is the controlling factor in determining whether the separation is a quit or discharge. If
the decision to separate the worker is a result of the
announced resignation to be effective at a future date,
t h e separation is a discharge. Unless t h e r e is some
other evidence of disqualifying conduct, benefits shall
be awarded,
lb) Q u i t
If a worker gives notice of an intent to leave work on
a particular date and is paid regular wages through
the announced resignation date, the separation is a
[juit even if the worker was relieved of work responsibilities prior to the effective date of resignation. A
separation is also a quit if a worker announces an
n t e n t to quit but agrees to continue working for an
ndefinite period, even though the date of separation
s determined by the employer. If a worker resigns,
a t e r decides to stay and announces an intent to
•emain employed, the reasonableness of the employer's refusal to continue the employment is t h e primary
actor in determining whether the claimant quit or
ras discharged. If the employer had already hired a
epiacement, or had taken other action because of the
laimant's impending quit, it may not be practical for
ae employer to allow the claimant to rescind the
ssignation, a n d it would be held the separation was a
uit,
(2) Leaving in Anticipation of Discharge,
If an individual leaves work in anticipation of a
Tssible discharge and if the reason for t h e discharge
ould not have been disqualifying, the separation is a
lit. However, an individual may not escape a dis-

qualification under the discharge provisions, Subsection 35A-4-405(2Xa), by quitting to avoid a discharge
t h a t would result in a denial of benefits. In this
circumstance the separation shall be considered a
discharge.
(3) Refusal to Follow Instructions (Constructive
Abandonment;.
If the worker refused or failed to follow reasonable
requests or instructions, knowing the loss of employment would result, the separation is a quit.
R994-405-205. D i s c i p l i n a r y S u s p e n s i o n .
When an individual is placed on a disciplinary
suspension, the definition of being unemployed may
be satisfied. If an individual files during the suspension period, the m a t t e r shall be adjudicated as a
discharge, even though t h e claimant may have a n
attachment to t h e employer and may expect to r e t u r n
to work. A suspension t h a t is reasonable and necessary to prevent potential h a r m to the employer will
generally result in a disqualification if the elements of
knowledge and control a r e established. If the individual fails to return to work at the end of the
suspension period, the separation is a voluntary quit
and may then be adjudicated under Subsection 35A4-405(1), if benefits had not been previously denied.
RO94-405-206. P r o x i m a l C a u s e - R e l a t i o n of t h e
Offense t o t h e D i s c h a r g e .
(1) The cause for discharge is the conduct that
motivated the employer to m a k e the decision to discharge the worker. If a separation decision has been
made, it is generally demonstrated by giving notice to
t h e worker. Although the employer may learn of other
offenses following the decision to terminate the worke r ^ services, the reason for the discharge is limited to
the conduct the employer was aware of prior to
making the separation decision. If an employer discharged an individual because of preliminary evidence, but did not obtain "proof* of the conduct until
after the separation notice was given, it may still be
concluded the discharge was caused by the conduct
t h e employer was investigating.
(2) If the discharge did not occur immediately after
the employer became aware of an offense, a presumption arises that there were other reasons for the
discharge. The relationship between the offense and
the discharge must be established both as to cause
and time. The presumption t h a t a particular offense
was not the cause of the discharge may be overcome
by showing the delay was necessary to accommodate
further investigation, arbitration or hearings related
to the worker's conduct. If an individual files for
benefits while a grievance or arbitration process is
pending, the Department shall make a decision based
on the best information available. The D e p a r t m e n t s
decision is not binding on the grievance process nor is
the decision of an arbitrator binding upon the Department. If an employer elects to reduce its workforce
and uses a w o r k e r s prior conduct as the criteria for
determining who will be laid off, the separation is a
reduction of force.
R994-405-207. I n C o n n e c t i o n w i t h E m p l o y m e n t .
Disqualifying conduct is not limited to offenses that
take place on the employer's premises or during
business hours. However, it is necessary t h a t the
offense be connected to the employment in such a
manner that it is a subject of legitimate and significant concern to the employer. Employers generally
have t h e right to expect that employees shall refrain
from acts detrimental to th^ business or that would
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